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Final Exit: Should the Double Effect
Rule Regarding the Legality of
Euthanasia in the United Kingdom be
Laid to Rest?
ABSTRACT
This Note explores the double effect rule that currently
governs physician-assisted suicide cases in the United
Kingdom. Recent events in the British medical and legal
community have raised serious questions about the rule's
adequacy, and have arguably created an environment in
which Parliament must reexamine the validity of both the
double effect rule and the laws governing active euthanasia.
After providing some historicalbackground regardingthe
origins and development of the double effect rule, this Note
surveys recent developments such as changing attitudes
towards euthanasia and the public reaction to the Moor
verdict, both of which have created an environment that is
highly criticalof the double effect rule. It then analyzes these
criticisms in light of the widespread confusion that
application of the rule has caused in both the medical and
legal community, and the conspicuousfailure of Parliamentto
respond by legislating on this topic.
This Note argues that the United Kingdom should move
away from a rule that essentially turns a blind eye to
euthanasiaand toward one which makes physician-assisted
suicide legal only when it is carried out under a number of
stringent, well-defined procedures and safeguards. It then
provides a legal framework designed to aid Parliament in
creating a balanced law that provides doctors with clear
guidelines regarding their conduct, while ensuring that
patient and societal interests in curbing potential abuses in
this areaare addressed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is currently a lack of specific law in Britain dealing
directly with voluntary active euthanasia.' Rather than address
the issue through legislation, British Parliament directs courts to
apply the principle of double effect in suspected voluntary active
euthanasia cases in order to distinguish situations where a
physician's actions intentionally hasten the death of a patient
from those in which the death of the patient occurs as an
unintentional secondary effect of treating a terminally ill patient's
pain with drugs. Under the double effect principle, physicians
may engage in an action which has both a positive and negative
effect without prosecution if the action is undertaken with the
intention of achieving only the possible good effect (pain relief),
without intending the possible bad effect (death of the patient)
even though it may be a foreseen consequence. 2 Although this
principal attempts to allow those who are morally opposed to
assisted suicide a framework in which to provide adequate pain
relief without violating the integrity of traditional medical morality
or their consciences, its application to end-of-life decisions has
been met with widespread criticism from the British medical,
legal, and general community. Among the biggest criticisms of
the present system is that it allows physicians to comply with
patient requests for death and avoid prosecution by misstating
their primary intention in terms of pain relief.
This Note will examine both the historical and recent events
that have led many to call for a change in the law regarding
voluntary active euthanasia in Britain. Part II of this Note will
explore the origins of the double effect principle and its initial
application to euthanasia by the courts in the case of Adams.

The Legal Position (Englandand Wales), in VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 266
1.
(A.B. Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986).
2.
Daniel P. Sulmasy & Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Rule of Double Effect,
159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 545, 545 (March 22, 1999).
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Part III will look at the changing attitudes regarding euthanasia
which led many groups to present legislation to Parliament calling
It will also explore the
for a reexamination of the law.
conspicuous failure to legislate by Parliament, especially in light
of the recent decision in Moor and the tremendous reaction to its
verdict by physicians, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, the
Part IV will
British Medical Association, and legal experts.
examine the specific criticisms that have been lodged against the
double effect principle, from its naive reliance on subjective
intentions to the harsh punishments that result from prosecuting
doctors for murder after they fail to meet the principle's
requirements. Finally, Part V will focus on the arguments for
changing the current system from a rule, which is inconsistently
applied and confuses physicians to one which legalizes voluntary
active euthanasia and allows the government to regulate its
practice. It will also discuss many of the procedural requirements
that should be implemented into the new law to ensure that it
clarifies the current confusion and does not create further
inconsistencies in the treatment of physicians dealing with endof-life decisions.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Euthanasia, derived from two Greek words meaning good (eu)
death (thantos)3 , is the "deliberate production of the death of a
human being on the grounds that in his situation it is considered
that it is better that he should be dead than that he should
continue to live." 4 English law focuses on two types of voluntary
euthanasia: passive and active.5 Passive euthanasia is defined as
the shortening of human life by the non-commencement or
withdrawal of treatment or life support. 6 Under English law,
doctors may honor a patient's request for passive euthanasia if
either made to the doctor personally or by an advance directive
("living will")7 in cases where the patient is unable to

3.

MARGARET C. JASPER, THE RIGHT TO DIE 1 (1996).

John Wilkinson, The Ethics of Euthanasia, 6 J. LAW Socy, SCOTLAND
4.
243, 243 (1990), LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. File.
Pat Tate, What the Law Says About GPs and Euthanasia,PULSE, July
5.
19, 1997, at 80, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. File.
6.

Id.

An example of a living will is found in the Voluntary Euthanasia Act
7.
1969. In part, it reads as follows:
If I should at any time suffer from a serious physical illness or
impairment reasonably thought in my case to be incurable and expected to
cause me severe distress or render me incapable of rational existence, I
request the administration of euthanasia at a time or in circumstances to
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communicate. 8 The legality of passive euthanasia, as set forth in
a 1993 court judgement in the Tony Bland case, is derived from
the fact that suicide has been legal in the United Kingdom since
the 1960s.9 Thus, if patients wish to end their lives prematurely
by declining life-sustaining treatment, the law will respect their
decision to do so.
Active euthanasia, however, is forbidden under current
English law.' 0 Active euthanasia is defined as taking positive
steps, which shorten the life of an ill person, usually by means of
administering drugs."
Any doctor who performs active
euthanasia at the request of a patient is guilty of murder under
English law. 12 Likewise, if a doctor takes active steps to help a
patient take their own life, such as providing the patient with
drugs, then they will be guilty of the crime of assisting a
3
suicide.'
English law does not consider it euthanasia, however, when a
doctor's active steps are taken with the intention of relieving a
patient's pain and suffering, even if these steps also shorten the
life of the patient. 14 This distinction is made possible by the
ethical principle of double effect, which currently serves, as the
United Kingdom's legal stance on the permissibility of euthanasia.
The rule of double effect states that an action which has two
possible effects, "one good and one bad, is morally permissible if
the action: (1) is not in itself immoral, (2) is undertaken only with
the intention of achieving the possible good effect, without
intending the possible bad effect, although both effects are
foreseen, (3) does not bring about the possible good effect by

be indicated or specified by me or, if it is apparent that I have become
incapable of giving directions, at the discretion of the physician in charge
of my case.
In the event of my suffering from any of the conditions specified
above, I request that no active steps should be taken, and in particular
that no resuscitatory techniques should be used, to prolong my life or
restore me to consciousness.
This declaration is to remain in force unless I revoke it, which I may
do at any time, and any request I may make concerning action to be taken
or withheld in connection with this declaration will be made without
further formalities.
EIKE-HENNER W. KLUGE, THE PRACTICE OF DEATH 154 (1975).

8.
See id.; Andrew Woodcock, Most GPs Get Patient Requests to Assist
Death, SCOTSMAN, July 21, 1997, at 5, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. File.
9.
Twelve people have had artificial feeding withdrawn since the landmark
case of Tony Bland that authorized the removal of food and water to patients in a
persistent vegetative state.
10.
Tate, supra note 5, at 80.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
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means of the possible bad effect, and (4) is undertaken for a
proportionately grave reason."1 5 First formulated in seventeenth
century Christian ethical thought by Roman Catholic moral
theologians, the principle which underlies the law of double effect
has been applied to a wide variety of situations in which a
foreseeable bad consequence creates a moral dilemma. 16 The
rule has attempted to play an especially important role in the care
of the dying, allowing those who are morally opposed to assisted
suicide a framework in which to provide adequate pain relief
without violating the integrity of traditional medical morality or
17
their consciences.
In the abstract, treating a dying patient in pain with
diamorphine i s appears to satisfy the four criteria for double
effect. 19 The use of diamorphine (1) is not itself immoral; (2) is
undertaken only with the intention of relieving pain, not of
causing death through respiratory depression; (3) will relieve pain
without first killing the patient; and (4) the relief of terminal pain
is a proportionately grave reason for risking the hastening of
death.20 The application of this rule to the care of the dying,
however, has been highly criticized because it relies so strongly
upon the subjective positive intention of the health care
provider. 2 1 Without scrupulous honesty and clinical integrity, the
who
principle of double effect is open to specious abuse by those
22
take active steps specifically designed to end a patient's life.
The rule of double effect was first applied by the English
courts to physician-assisted suicide in the trial of Dr. John
Bodkin Adams. 2 3 Dr. Adams was arrested on December 19, 1956
and charged with the murder of Edith Morrell, an eighty-one year
old patient who had been suffering from arteriosclerosis and the
effects of a stroke.2 4 Morrell had been a patient of Dr. Adams

15.
Sulmasy & Pellegrino, supranote 2, at 545.
Winkinson, supranote 4, at 243.
16.
17.
Sulmasy & Pellegrino, supranote 2, at 545.
18.
Diamorphine is another name for heroin and is the most common way
that doctors treat the pain of their dying patients. Cherry Norton, Doctor Will You
Help Me Die?, SUNDAY TIMES, November 15, 1998, at 14, 1988 WL 21853258. The
use of diamorphine to alleviate pain is entirely legal. The result of high dosages,
however, is often death. Id.
19.
Sulmasy & Pellegrino, supranote 2, at 545.
20.
Id.
21.
Cherry Norton, An End Soon to Hypocrisy of Treating the Dying?,
INDEPENDENT, May 12, 1999, at 3, 1999 WL 15745301.
Id.
22.
23.
Henry Palmer, Dr. Adams' Trial for Murder, 4 CRIM. L. R. 365, 375
(1957); Raanan Gillon, Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia:HistoricalPerspective,
in VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 222 (A.B. Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986).
24.
Michael Watson, A Case of Medical Necessity?, 149 NEw L. J. 863
(1999), LEXIS, Secondary Legal Library, The New Law Journal File.
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charging him with murder, the prosecution

stated that Dr. Adams had injected Morrell with heroin and
morphia with the intention of shortening her life, not alleviating
26
her pain, so that he could allegedly benefit under her will.

In speaking for the court, Justice Devlin first explained to the
jury that murder is:
an act or series of acts, done by the prisoner, which were intended
to kill, and did in fact kill. It did not matter whether Mrs. Morrell's
death was inevitable and that her days were numbered. If her life
was cut short by weeks or months it was just as much murder as if
it was cut short by years. If the first purpose of medicine the
restoration of health could no longer be achieved, t.here was still
much for the doctor to do, and he was entitled to do all that was
proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering even if the
measures he took might incidentally shorten life by hours or even
27
longer.

This statement called for the jury to examine Dr. Adams'
subjective intent in medicating Mrs. Morrell to determine whether
his intention was to relieve the patient's pain or end her life.
Although the jury acquitted Dr. Adams of the murder of Edith
Morrell in only forty-two minutes, this case first established the
double effect principle, which currently serves as the United
Kingdom's legal stance with regards to physician-assisted
suicide. 28 This precedent was later codified in the Suicide Act of
1961 which states that a doctor who "aids, abets, counsels or
procures the suicide of another" may be changed with murder
29
and sentenced to life in prison upon a determination of guilt.

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CALLING FOR A CHANGE IN THE LAW

A. ChangingAttitudes Toward Euthanasiaand
the Adequacy of the Double Effect Rule

In November of 1998, the Sunday Times released the results
of a study which showed that many family doctors secretly hasten

25.
Palmer, supranote 23, at 365.
26.
The prosecution attempted to show that Morrell was not suffering from
severe pain or restlessness to such an extent as to justify the dosage levels that
Adams gave to her. Id. at 365-68; Jeremy Laurance, Death on Prescription?,
INDEPENDENT, May 13, 1999, at 1, 1999 WL 15745641.
27.
Palmer, supra note 23, at 375.
28.
Id. at 377; Watson, supranote 24, at 863.
29.
Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, § 2(2)(Eng.). The Act, however,
also notes that "no proceedings shall be instituted for an offence under this
section except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions." Id.
at § 2(4).
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the deaths of their terminally ill patients, while even more believe
that this practice should be legal.3 0
Of the 300 General
Practitioners (GPs) interviewed by the Sunday Times, one out of
seven (fifteen percent) admitted to helping patients die at their
request.3 1 On average, these GP's admitted to assisting five
deaths. 3 2
The implications of this study suggested that
hundreds, most likely thousands, of patients in the United
33
Kingdom were dying each year with the aid of a physician.
The study also stated that sixty percent of doctors who
replied to the questionnaire believe that a doctor should be able
to administer large doses of painkillers in full knowledge that
death is likely to result without fear of prosecution.3 4 An even
higher number (sixty-eight percent) felt that doctors should be
35
able to assist death by withdrawing or withholding treatment.
Additionally, eighteen percent of those GPs surveyed stated that
doctors should be able to prescribe lethal medication that
patients can take with the intention of killing themselves.3 6 The
results of the Sunday Times survey suggested that many GPs and
hospital doctors would like to see a change in the law regarding
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.3 7 While the results of
the Sunday Times survey received a great deal of attention in the
media, most likely due to the Lindsell and the Moor case
(discussed below), they were merely demonstrative of the growing
change in physician attitudes over the last decade regarding
euthanasia, a trend which had already been reflected in earlier
surveys.3 8 For example, a 1987 National Opinion Poll of 301 GPs
conducted by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (VES) stated that
thirty percent of GPs agreed with the concept of voluntary
euthanasia.3 9 The results of this survey also showed that a large
percentage of GPs would consider practicing euthanasia if a
patient requested it, despite their personal disfavor of it. 40

A

1994 survey by the British Medical Journal (BMJ) also showed
that forty-six percent of doctors would consider taking active

30.
31.
32.
28, 1998,
33.
34.

Norton, supranote 18, at 14.
Id.; Watson, supra note 24, at 863.
One In Seven GPs Admits Illegally Hastening Death, PULSE, November
at 8, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. File.
Norton, supra note 18, at 14.
Id.

35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
What GPs Really Think About Hastening Death, PULSE, November 28,
1998, at 32, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. File; Simon Macklin, Mercy Killing
Debate, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 18, 1999, at 15, LEXIS, News Library,
Non-U.S. File.

38.
39.
40.

What GPs Really Think About HasteningDeath, supranote 37, at 32.
Id.
Id.
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steps in bringing about a patient's death if the law was
changed. 4 1 The BMJ survey also stated that forty-five percent of
doctors had been asked to take active steps to hasten death, and
of these, thirty-two percent had complied with such a request. 42
Similar results were also reflected in subsequent surveys by the
Medical Law Unit at43 the University of Glasgow and the British
Medical Association.
A similar change in attitudes regarding euthanasia was also
seen in the British public. According to polls, support for
euthanasia has grown from around fifty percent in the 1950s to
eighty-two percent in a 1996 British Social Attitudes survey.4 4 In
addition, all of the main religious denominations in Britain also
show a majority preference for the legalization of active voluntary
euthanasia.45 Self-declared Roman Catholics show seventy-three
percent approval, members of the Church of England eighty
percent, and the Jewish community sixty percent approval. 4 6 Not
surprisingly, atheists are most in favor of active voluntary
euthanasia with ninety-three percent approval. 4 7 In spite of all
this public support for voluntary euthanasia, however, Parliament
still refuses to change the law.
The results of these surveys highlight many of the issues that
are important to the debate regarding the adequacy of the double

41.
B.J. Ward & P.A. Tate, Attitudes Among NHS Doctors to Requests for
Euthanasia,308 BRIT. MED. J. 1132, 1134 (1994) (reporting the result of a survey
which explored NHS doctors' attitudes to competent patients' requests for
euthanasia and estimates the proportion of doctors who have taken active steps to
hasten a patient's death).
42.
Id. at 1332.
43.
What GPs Really Think About HasteningDeath, supra note 37, at 32. A
1996 postal survey of 1,000 medical practitioners' attitudes (12% of which were
GPs) conducted by Professor Sheila McLean of the Medical Law Unit at the
University of Glasgow showed that 55% of the respondents believed it should be
legal to aid in the suicide of a patient who is either terminally ill or suffering from
severe mental or physical pain. Id. Likewise, a 1996 survey of 750 GPs published
in the British Medical Association News Review found that 46% of doctors
supported changing the law to allow doctors to carry out a euthanasia request
from a terminally ill patient. Id.
44.
Laurance, supra note 26, at 1. These percentages are based upon
surveys of the middle classes. Id. The poor and partly educated are more likely to
be in support of euthanasia than the elderly, who despite being the beneficiaries of
a swift and painless death, are the class least likely to support it. Id.
45.

The Voluntary EuthanasiaSociety, in VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 259 (A.B.

Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986).
46.
Jean Davies, The Case for Legalising Voluntary Euthanasia, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 83, 93 (John Keown ed., 1995). The high numbers found in
the Jewish Community are interesting in light of the Nazi misuse of the word
"euthanasia." The Voluntary EuthanasiaSociety, supra note 45, at 259. The Nazis
misused the word euthanasia to mean the destruction of handicapped people
regardless of their wishes. Id. In these discussions, however, the word is used in
its original Greek-derived sense of a gentle death. Davies, supra,at 84.
47.
See Davies, supra note 46, at 93.
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effect rule. The first is the high number of incidences in which a
doctor is asked to take active steps to hasten the death of a
patient. In each of the surveys, nearly half of the doctors had
received such a request. A second issue is the high number of
GPs who have complied with these patient requests and have
avoided prosecution either through a lack of discovery or a
misstatement of primary intent in accordance with the double
effect principle. A final issue is the increase in the number of
practitioners who said they believe the law should be changed
from thirty percent in 1987 to sixty percent in the 1998 Sunday
Times survey.
B. Legislative Inaction andAttempts to Change the Law
Despite the widespread support of the public and the medical
community for a change in the law regarding active voluntary
euthanasia, there has been a surprising lack of support for
changing the law in the British Parliament. In the past sixty
years, seven bills have been presented to Parliament, all of which
were met with a refusal to legislate. 48 Critics claim that this
legislative inaction is due to the heavy influence of the Church of
England, the Roman Catholic Church in England, and much of
the British Medical Association (BMA).4 9 Thus, because of the
strong influence of these groups over Parliament, only a few
hours of debate on a bill are permitted to keep up appearances of
fairness before the matter is quietly dropped. s ° Like politicians
everywhere, those who comprise the British Parliament desire to
distance themselves from moral issues.5 1
Thus, the British
establishment prefers to allow assisted deaths to be carried out
covertly rather than take a stance on the issue of the legality of
euthanasia that may enrage religious or other support groups.5 2
The first bill to be heard by Parliament was the Voluntary
Euthanasia (Legislation) Bill that was prepared by the VES and
presented to the House of Lords in November 1936 by Lord
Ponsonby.5 3 Although rejected upon its second reading, the Bill
was successful in generating considerable public debate and
attracting new members and supporters to the VES, many of
s4
whom were distinguished in the arts, sciences and professions.

48.
49.

164 (1998).
Despite the widespread support for change throughout both

DEREK HUMPHRY & MARY CLEMENT, FREEDOM TO DIE

Id.

religious communities and the British medical community, the official sanctioning
bodies of these groups use their power to assert their opposition to change. Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
The Voluntary EuthanasiaSociety, supranote 45, at 256.
54.
Id.
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Despite this growing awareness and support, the next Voluntary
Euthanasia Bill was not introduced until some thirty-three years
later in 196955 and was again met with the same lack of
enthusiasm and support from the legislature. 5 6 It was during
this period, however, that the Suicide Act was passed giving the
society some hope that Parliament may listen to further pleas to
change the law.5 7
This hope was destroyed in 1976 when
Parliament struck down a very moderate Bill regarding mostly
passive euthanasia measures.58
Although the Suicide Act of 1961 was a logical response to
the court's opinion in the Adams case, it began to fall under
heavy criticism in the House of Commons in the mid-1980s as
attitudes towards physician-assisted suicide changed globally. 59
In 1985, the House of Lords proposed a bill that would amend the
Suicide Act to remove penalties for "compassionate assistance" of
death. 60 The amendment, however, was rejected. 6 1 The issue
came before the House of Commons again in 1991 when a 10Minute Rule bill on voluntary euthanasia was also rejected. 6 2 In
response to heightened political and social scrutiny, the House of
Lords appointed a special committee on medical ethics in 1994 to
deal with the issue of euthanasia and the doctrine of double
effect. 6 3 The committee reaffin-med its stance against euthanasia,

55.
For the complete text of the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1969, see
Voluntary EuthanasiaBill 1969, in VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA app. 1 at 275-83 (A.B.
Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986).
56.
The Voluntary EuthanasiaSociety, supra note 45, at 256.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. This bill, known as the Incurable Patients Bill, was introduced to
the House of Lords by Baroness Wootton. Id.
59.
See Louise Robson, UK: House of Commons to Debate Right-To-Die
Legislation,AAP NEWSFEED, November 21, 1997, LEXIS, Nexis Library, AAP File.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. The committee's terms of reference were:
to consider the ethical, legal and clinical implications of a person's
right to withhold consent to life-prolonging treatment, and the position of
persons who are no longer able to give or withhold consent;
and to consider whether and in what circumstances actions that
have as their intention or a likely consequence the shortening of another
person's life may be justified on the grounds that they accord with that
person's wishes or that person's best interests;
and in all the foregoing considerations to pay regard to the likely
effect of changes in law or medical practice on society as a whole.
Id. Although the word "euthanasia" was not used, the first paragraph describes
passive euthanasia, while the second paragraph describes voluntary euthanasia.
Davies, supranote 46, at 83. The Voluntary Euthanasia Society heavily criticized
the Committee for failure to take into account the British Medical Journal survey
that reported that half of the doctors who were asked by their patients for help to
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and showed continued reliance upon the double effect principle in
determining whether or not doctors should be prosecuted for
murder when the alleviation of pain results in a shortened
lifespan. 6 4 This report was seen by many as merely an attempt at
consensus by the House of Lords rather than an attempt to
address the real issue of whether euthanasia was being practiced
65
surreptitiously under the guise of double effect.
British Parliament debated right-to-die legislation a final time
in November 1997.
The Doctor Assisted Dying Bill was
introduced in response to extensive debate in England over
euthanasia legislation in Australia's Northern Territory and the
actions of Annie Lindsell, a dying woman who sought a High
Court declaration that her doctor could alleviate her discomfort
even if the treatment shortens her life. 6 6 Lindsell brought her
case before the High Court after her GP, Dr. Simon Holmes,
refused to administer her palliative care absent court assurance
that he would not be prosecuted. 6 7 Although some questioned
why it was necessary for Lindsell to bring her case in front of the
Court since her situation was "clearly" addressed by the doctrine
of double effect, her request to the court for clarification was
demonstrative of the growing confusion over the adequacy of the
doctrine. 68
Lindsell later withdrew her application for court
intervention after two neurologists consulted for the case
approved a diamorphine schedule proposed by Dr. Holmes and
69
agreed to by Lindsell.
Although Lindsell's request did not ask the court to condone
euthanasia, many people interpreted her petition that way,

die complied. John Oliver, Letter: Why Choose Bad Death Before a Good OneP,
THE OBSERVER, December 11, 1994, at 18, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Observer File.
64.
Davies, supranote 46, at 93.
65.
Oliver, supra note 63, at 18. Oliver, speaking on behalf of the
Voluntary Euthanasia Society, felt the committee's report was misinformed as to
present medical attitudes towards euthanasia and the prevalence of compliance
among British doctors to requests from their patients for help to die.
66.
Robson, supra note 59. The bill would allow doctors to prescribe lethal
drugs to a patient if the patient requests them both to a doctor and to a
consultant specialist. Id.
67.
High Court No Help to 'Easing Death" GP, PULSE, November 8, 1997, at
2, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Pulse File.
68.
"Loose Talk" Has Bred Confusion, PULSE, November 1, 1997, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Pulse File.
69.
Philip Johnson, A Campaign of Confusion Over Right to Die, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), April 1, 1998, at 8, 1998 WL 3007831. The two neurologists
consulted for the case stated that a five milligram dose of diamorphine every four
to six hours would be appropriate to relieve pain while not incurring an undue
risk of immediate death. Id.
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including the VES. 70 According to a VES spokesperson, Lindsell
brought her case because, "it was not clear in law that Annie
could receive diamorphine to relieve her distress rather than just
her physical pain."7 1 Because Dr. Holmes had first proposed
administering diamorphine for Lindsell's mental distress caused
by the onset of swallowing difficulties rather than for his patient's
pain, the VES felt that clarification was needed on the issue of
whether or not double effect would protect a doctor whose
primary intention was to alleviate the mental suffering of his
patient. 7 2
The VES viewed the Lindsell case as a "major
breakthrough" because it established in the minds of the public
the case for euthanasia and impacted public opinion on the
subject. 73 Their view was further supported by the fact that the
judge in the case, Sir Stephen Brown, did not award any costs
against Lindsell, as is customary in the British legal system. 74
Despite any breakthrough that may have resulted from the
Lindsell case, the law remained unchanged.
C. The Impact of a Confession: The Adequacy of the
Double Effect Rule is Taken to Court

1. The Irwin Case
The widespread debate over the adequacy of the double effect
principle in the United Kingdom peaked in 1997 with a wave of
doctors confessing to giving lethal doses of drugs to hasten the
deaths of their terminally ill patients.7 5 The first of these doctors
was Michael Irwin, a former medical director of the United
Nations and current chairman of the Voluntary Euthanasia
Society. 7 6 In speaking out about the double effect principle, Dr.

70.
The Voluntary Euthanasia Society fully backed Lindsell throughout her
proceedings. Id.; Marian Pallister, The Law Versus Pain, HERALD, October 28,
1997, at 13, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Herald File.
71.
Johnston, supranote 69, at 8.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Melanie Phillips, Euthanasia's Dose of Doublethink, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), May 16, 1999, at 17, 1999 WL 18874907. The Voluntary Euthanasia
Society felt that Brown's decision not to award costs was indicative of a growing
sympathetic climate regarding the issue of euthanasia. It has been argued that
Brown's decision was based on a fear of a public outcry that may result if costs
were awarded against someone in such a pitiful physical state as Lindsell. Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Lucy Patton, Euthanasia Doctor Accused of Executions, GUARDIAN
(London), July 21, 1997, at 4, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Guardian File; Andrew
Woodcock & Rachel Ellis, Murder Quiz Call Into GPs' Mercy Killings, WESTERN DAILY
PRESS (Somerset, England), July 21, 1997, at 12, LEXIS, Nexis Libary, Western
Daily Press File.
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Irwin stated that, "Most good doctors have done this. I have
helped about 50 people in this manner. Doctors will never admit
that they have given it to honor a patient's request to die. I am
trying to expose the hypocrisy of the double effect." 77 He then
stated, "I must admit that because these individuals repeatedly
expressed a wish to die earlier than might have been expectedoften only perhaps a matter of a week or two earlier-and were
supported by their families in this matter, the intention of my
actions was to end their lives and not only to ease their
suffering."7 8 Dr. Irwin's comments were in response to a vote at
the 1997 annual British Medical Association (BMA) conference
that opposed legalizing euthanasia. 7 9
These statements
immediately sparked a national debate over euthanasia and the
adequacy of the double effect principle. 8 0 Despite Irwin's clear
intention to end his patients' lives and a call for action by Dr.
Stuart Homer, the chairman of the BMA's medical ethics
committee, Irwin was never prosecuted under the 1961 Suicide
Act.8 1
2. The Moor Case
The first doctor in Britain to face murder charges under the
1961 Suicide Act for the mercy killing of an invalid was Dr. David
Moor. Moor had been a popular general practitioner in northeast
England for 30 years and had a reputation for being hardworking and well-liked. 8 2 Dr. Moor was arrested after a press
conference in which he had spoken in support of Dr. Irwin's views
and stated that he had also helped an average of 10 patients a
year to die throughout his medical career.8 3 The prosecution
used Moor's admissions to charge him with the murder of George
Liddell, an 85-year-old retired ambulance driver who Moor had
been treating for cancer of the colon.8 4 It was alleged by the

77.
78.
79.

Patton, supra note 76, at 4.
Woodcock & Ellis, supranote 76, at 12.
Rachel Ellis, Euthanasia Case Doctor Bailed, PRESS ASSOcIATION

NEwsFILE, July 30, 1997, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Press Assoc. File.

80.
Macklin, supranote 37, at 15.
81.
Ellis, supra note 79. A spokesperson for the Sussex police stated that
they were not going to launch an investigation into Dr. Irwin but were instead
cooperating with the Crown Prosecution Service and British Medical Association.
Id. In response, the General Medical Council said it would not take any action
unless there was a conviction. Id. Thus, Irwin avoided prosecution through the
mutual acquiescence of both sanctioning bodies. Id.
82.
Macklin, supra note 37, at 15.
83.
Id.; Patton, supra note 76, at 4.
84.
Macklin, supra note 37, at 15. The connection between Moor and
Liddell's death was made by Leonard Coyle, a Newcastle coroner, who was
examining Liddell's details while Dr. Moor's views were being covered in the news.
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prosecution that Moor had given Liddell a lethal dose of the pain
killer diamorphine with the intention of shortening his life.8 5
When confronted with the possibility of prosecution for his
actions, Dr. Moor responded that he did not care because 8he
6
thought, "there need[ed] to be a clarification of the law on this."
At trial, however, Dr. Moor denied ever having murdered
anyone, claiming that he administered diamorphine to Mr. Liddell
in accordance with the double effect principle.8 7 In order to
prosecute Moor for murder, it was necessary for the prosecution
to show both that the dose of diamorphine administered to Liddell
was beyond what would normally be required to ease suffering
and that Moor had the primary intention of ending Liddell's life.8 8
The case against Moor collapsed when expert witnesses disagreed
about the level of diamorphine in Liddell's body, leading the
judge, Mr. Justice Hooper, to instruct the jury to disregard the
toxicology tests done on Liddell's body as unreliable. 8 9 Lacking
proper evidence upon which a conviction for murder could be
made, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict of not guilty
and Moor was acquitted of the murder of George Liddell on May
11, 1999.90 Hooper, however, only awarded Moor two-thirds of
his defense costs because, in his opinion, Moor had brought the
prosecution upon himself by making "silly remarks" to the
91
press.
D. Reaction to the Moor Verdict and the Present Callfor
Clarification
The acquittal of Dr. David Moor was met with a wide range of
reactions from the general public, as well as both the British
medical and legal community. Advocates of euthanasia were
pleased with Moor's acquittal, stating that the verdict
demonstrates that "euthanasia is alive and well" 92 and that the
refusal of the jury to convict Moor was demonstrative of the

Id. Seeing a number of similarities, Coyle contacted the authorities. See Jennifer
Trueland, The Moment of Mercy That Put a Doctor in the Dock, SCOTSMAN (Scotland),
May 17, 1999, at 12, 1999 WL 18796221.
See Truland, supra note 84, at 12.
85.
Patton, supra note 76, at 4.
86.
87.
Macklin, supra note 37, at 15.
Philip Johnston, Doctor Talked Himselflnto the Dock, DAILY TELEGRAPH
88.
(London), May 12, 1999, at 5, 1999 WL 18463320.
89.
Alan MacDermid, Verdict Fuels Euthanasia Row in Medical World,
HERALD (United Kingdom), May 12, 1999, at 1, 1999 WL 17019278.
Id.; see also A Matter of Life and Death, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), May
90.
12, 1999, at 25.
See A Matterof Life and Death, supranote 90, at 25.
91.
Id.
92.
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93
change in public attitudes regarding laws against euthanasia.
Still, others have stated that there is a real danger that the
medical profession and the public will interpret Moor's acquittal
94
as a step towards the decriminalization of euthanasia.
Regardless of how the verdict is interpreted, Moor's acquittal
illustrates how vulnerable a prosecution is to the expressed intent
and honesty of the defendant doctor under the double effect
9s
principle.

1. Physician Reactions
The trial of Dr. Moor was met with the strongest reaction
from British GPs who used Moor's acquittal to again call for a
change in the laws governing palliative care. 9 6 As a number of
attitude surveys have shown, physician support for legalizing
euthanasia in the United Kingdom has almost doubled within the
last decade.9 7 This increase in support for euthanasia has also
increased awareness among GPs of the confusion caused by
applying the double effect principle. Thus, doctors point out that
many physicians already secretly hasten the death of terminally
ill patients, but are then forced into the hypocritical position of
saying that their prime intention is to alleviate pain rather than
hasten death to avoid being prosecuted for murder. 98
Many doctors feel that the current law punishes them for
what the say as opposed to what they do, with the Moor case
serving as a prime example of what can happen when a doctor
chooses to advocate his true intentions.9 9 While the double effect
principle offers a defense behind which the practice of mercy
killing can hide, most doctors would rather see a change in the
law so that they can practice medicine according to clear
guidelines
and honor patient requests without
fear of
prosecution. l0 0 As one euthanasia supporter pointed out, British

93.
Timothy E. Quill, et al., The Rule of Double Effect-A Critique of Its Role
in End-of-Life DecisionMaking, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1768, 1770 (1997).
94.
Id.
95.
See generally, We Can No Longer Duck Euthanasia Legislation,
INDEPENDENT (London), May 12, 1999, at 3, 1999 WL 15745451.
96.
Norton, supranote 21, at 3.
97.
What GPs Really Think About HasteningDeath, supra note 37, at 32.
98.
Id. Dr. Christopher Hindley, who has admitted to hastening the deaths
of 10 patients at their request, believes that it is hypocritical that many GPs hide
behind the doctrine of double effect when their true intention is to shorten life.
Norton, supranote 21, at 3.
99.
Laurance, supranote 26, at 1.
100. Id.; Veronica Cowan, Last Rights: The Lawyers Involved in the
Prosecution of Dr. Dave Moor For Mercy Killing Talk About the Implications of the
Case, LAW Socy GUARDIAN GAz., May 26, 1999, at 20, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Law
Soc'y Guardian Gaz. File; Norton, supranote 21, at 3.
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0
GPs "cannot have a half-law when it comes to this."' ' Presently,
if a physician does not do all he can to preserve the life of a
terminally ill patient up to the last possible gasp, he renders
10 2
This risk has put3
himself liable to prosecution for murder.
10
and ethically.
morally
both
position
terrible
physicians in a
Many feel that the only way to effectively deal with this situation
is for the British Parliament to make up its mind whether or not
voluntary euthanasia under proper safeguards is justifiable by
10 4
legislating on the subject.

2. The Voluntary Euthanasia Society
Among the most vocal of doctors supporting euthanasia are
those who comprise the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, the proeuthanasia group currently led by Dr. Michael Irwin. Originally
formed in 1935, the VES has dedicated itself to effecting a change
in euthanasia laws and providing guidelines for doctors faced
s
The society feels that doctors are
with end-of-life decisions.' 0
currently operating in a gray area without the benefit of
guidelines, allowing them to provide medicine with the intention
10 6
of ending a patient's life, provided they remain silent about it.
According to the VES, voluntary euthanasia in Britain today takes
place in a "shadowy criminal world" where patients cannot be
assured that they will get the relief they are asking for, and
doctors are denied the open advice and consultation of their
colleagues. 10 7 Thus, the VES feels that the legislative inaction
and committee activity of the British Parliament is "naive in
failing to acknowledge that euthanasia is being practiced
10 8
surreptitiously under the guise of the doctrine of double effect.
The VES claims that up to 100,000 patients die from active
voluntary euthanasia each year, and that in light of the Moor
verdict, doctors may continue to avoid prosecution as long as they
10 9
Thus, it is evident
claim they did not intend to shorten life.

101. The statement was made by Dr. Peggy Norris, chairwoman of the antieuthanasia group ALERT. See Clare Dyer, Doctor Cleared of Murdering Patient,
GUARDIAN (London), May 12, 1999, at 1, 1999 WL 18924319.
102. W.R. Matthews, Voluntary Euthanasia:A Christian View, in VOLUNTARY
EUTHANASIA 70 (A.B. Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986).
103. Norton, supra note 21, at 3 (describing the difficulty family doctors
have faced over the last 18 months when presented with a "terminally ill patient in
great pain").
104. Matthews, supra note 102, at 70.
The Voluntary EuthanasiaSociety, supra note 45, at 255, 275-76.
105.
106. Michael Horsnell, Thousands of Doctors 'Reassured by Verdict," TIMES
(London), May 12, 1999, at 3, 1999 WL 7993481.
107. HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 164.
108. Oliver, supranote 63, at 18.
109. Horsnell, supranote 106, at 3.
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from the VES's viewpoint that double effect is in effect a defense
or loophole as opposed to the law that governs doctor actions in
euthanasia cases.1 1 0 Despite the victory that the VES believes it
won in the Moor case, the Society still feels that stringent
guidelines, which have continually been promised by the British
Medical Association, are necessary in order that doctors may
effectively administer care to ease the pain of terminal illness
without fear of prosecution.1 ' As Dr. Irwin said, "[using drugs
that hasten death] is legal as long as the intention is not to end
2
life. But isn't this just society's wink to euthanasia?""1
3. The Response of the British Medical Association
Despite calls for a change or clarification in the law after the
Moor verdict, the British Medical Association (BMA) insists that
the Moor trial should not be seen as breaking new ground on the
issue of euthanasia. 1 13 Dr. Michael Wilks, who chairs the BMA
medical ethics committee, stated that, "[euthanasia] is illegal in
this country. The BMA supports the existing law and although
there is a range of views amongst doctors, the majority opinion in4
the medical profession remains firmly opposed to euthanasia.""1
Wilks feels that the current law is clear to both the public and
physicians, and that the jury applied it properly to the Moor case
1 15
In
in finding that Moor's intention was to relieve suffering.
addition, the BMA feels the current law is necessary to maintain
6
the trust that patients have in their doctors."
The BMA believes that the growing public support for
euthanasia is based on a misapprehension that pain and
suffering at the end of life is so severe that death is the only
answer.1 1 7 The BMA, however, feels that no pain is so great that

110. Id. John Oliver, the general secretary of the society, said that after the
Moor case, "[p]atients can be given sufficient pain relief even if this might hasten
their deaths, as long as the doctors claim they did not intend to shorten life. This
defense of double effect is a valid one." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See MacDermid, supranote 89, at 1.
114. Id. The BMA had previously voted against changing the law regarding
physician-assisted suicide in July of 1997 and November of 1998. Norton, supra
note 18, at 4.
115. See Horsnell, supra note 106, at 3; Norton, supra note 21, at 3. Dr.
Wilks stated that although "Dr. Moor's case has made many doctors nervous
about their position, the majority of doctors are very clear about their intentions
when treating terminally ill [patients]." Norton, supra note 21, at 3.
116. The BMA fears that patients will see doctors as "agents of death" if the
law is changed and that vulnerable people who are terminally ill will not be able to
trust doctors without the fear that the doctor could put pressure on them to end
their lives. Laurance, supra note 26, at 1.
117. Id.
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1 18
it cannot be controlled using modem medical practices.
Therefore, the BMA states that the present law which
distinguishes between hastening death and relieving suffering
must be maintained, and that no plans to change it are in the
This firm stance against
works following the Moor verdict.
also expressed by the
was
law
changing the euthanasia
Department of Health. 119

4. Legal Experts' Predictions: The Next Netherlands?
Despite the widespread confusion over the impact of Moor's
acquittal, legal experts have predicted that Moor could be the last
GP in the United Kingdom to face prosecution under the law of
double effect. 120 Some experts feel that the Moor case, when
looked at in conjunction with the 1957 Adams case, will provide
the Crown Prosecution Service with clear guidelines on the issue
of double effect. 12 1 These experts have attempted to draw a
distinction between cases such as Moor's and that of Dr. Nigel
Cox, a consultant rheumatologist who was prosecuted by the
General Medical Commission (GMC) for attempted murder after
a substance
bringing about the death of one of his patients using
12 2
with no therapeutic value at all: potassium chloride.
Although any change in the law regarding euthanasia should
come from the legislature, other legal experts feel that a series of
court judgements such as the Adams, Moor, and Bland cases
23
This is
could gradually establish the legality of euthanasia.'
precisely what occurred in the Netherlands where euthanasia is
technically illegal but has been decriminalized following a court
Termination of life is divided into three
ruling in 1981.124

118.

Id.

Cowan, supra note 100, at 20; GPs Need Not Fear Criminal Charges
119.
Over Double Effect, PULSE, May 22, 1999, at 7, 1999 WL 11559990.
GPs Need Not Fear Criminal Charges Over Double Effect, supra note
120.
119, at 7.
Id.
121.
Id.; Dyer, supra note 101, at 1. Cox's patient of long standing, Lillian
122.
Boyes, "made her wish for a tranquil death very plain to him" before he gave her a
lethal injection of potassium chloride. Davies, supra note 46, at 83. Despite a
finding of guilt by the GMC, however, Cox was not suspended or banished from
practicing medicine, but was merely reprimanded. See GMC Guides Consultants
but Pillories GPs, PULSE, April 10, 1999, at 7, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. News
File.
123. A Matterof Life and Death, supranote 90, at 25.
Macklin, supra note 37, at 15. The case laid down the ten rules for
124.
non-criminal assistance in dying by saying, "[tjhere must be physical or mental
suffering which the sufferer finds unbearable." Id. The court also stated that it is

not necessary for a person who requests euthanasia to be dying, but that mental

suffering such as that inflicted by being a paraplegic was enough. See HUMPHRY &
CLEMENT, supranote 48, at 148.
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categories in the Netherlands,' 2 s all of which are considered
felonies under the criminal code. 12 6 Under a doctrine known as
force majeure'2 7 (which recognizes that the conflict between a
physician's duty to preserve life and their duty not to allow a
patient to suffer may give rise to a situation similar to necessity
or duress), however, doctors are not prosecuted.' 28 Thus, upon a
showing of exonerating circumstances and compliance with
preordained criteria,' 29 physicians are granted immunity from
prosecution.' 3 0
This approach, which the Dutch government
plans to codify into the official law legalizing euthanasia at the
beginning of this year,' 3 ' was formalized after the Dutch
government and medical and legal institutions recognized the
3 2
extent of public sympathy for euthanasia.1
If the Dutch example can provide a lesson for the English
Parliament, it is that they must be the one to effect a change in
the law regarding euthanasia. 1 33 Although euthanasia was first
technically made legal in the Netherlands by a landmark 1981
court case, it was not until the Dutch Parliament approved
guidelines in 1993 for physicians to follow that the law began to
have any real effect.' 3 4 Absent guidelines, many Dutch doctors

125. Id. at 143.
The three categories of termination of life are: "(1)
termination of life at the request of the patient (euthanasia); (2) assisted suicide:
The doctor supplies a drug which the patient administers to himself or herself;
and (3) termination of life without a request from the patient." !d.
126. Id.
127. Article 40 of the Dutch Penal Code provides the following defense: 'Any
person who [is] compelled by force majeure or duress to commit an offence shall
not be criminally liable." Lesley Vickers, Assisted Dying and the Laws of Three
EuropeanCountries, 147 NEW L.J. 610, 610 (1997).
128. HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supranote 48, at 143.
129. Id. at 143-44. The criteria a doctor must observe are: (1) The patient
must have made voluntary, carefully considered, and persistent requests (to his
doctor) for euthanasia; (2) The attending physician must know the patient well
enough to assess whether the request is indeed voluntary and whether it is well
considered; (3) A close doctor-patient relationship is a prerequisite for such an
assessment; (4) According to prevailing medical opinion, the patient's suffering
must be unbearable and without prospect of improvement; (5) The doctor and the
patient must have considered and discussed alternatives to euthanasia; (6) The
attending physician must have consulted at least one other physician with an
independent viewpoint who must have read the medical records and seen the
patient; and (7) Euthanasia must have been performed by a doctor in accordance
with good medical practice. Id.
130.
Failure to comply with the strict guidelines would still result in
prosecution and a maximum 12-year jail term. See Officials Planning to Legalize
Euthanasia,CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1999, at 6.
131. The Dutch plans to legalize mercy killing under strict guidelines were
expected to gain parliamentary approval in 2000, which would make the
Netherlands the first country in the world to legalize mercy killing. Id.
132.
See HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supranote 48, at 143-44.
133.
See Johnston, supranote 69, at 8.
134.
See HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supranote 48, at 148-49.

2000]

DEBATING THE FUTURE OF THE DOUBLE EFFECTRULE

1055

and other health professionals simply took it upon themselves to
determine when their patients should die.' 3 5 There actions often
led to numerous incidents in which disabled newborns and
elderly persons were put to death.' 3 6
Once guidelines were
introduced, however, the Dutch government witnessed a move
towards compliance with the laws and away from the problems
3 7
caused by the ambiguous language used in the 1981 opinion.'
If Britain wishes to avoid the many problems that existed with the
precedent-based euthanasia law during the 1980s, then
Parliament must circumvent the courts and implement new
euthanasia guidelines itself.

IV.

SPECIFIC CRITICISMS OF THE DOUBLE EFFECT RULE

Before a solution to the present difficulties regarding the use
of the double effect rule can be proposed, it is necessary to look at
the specific criticisms that have been raised regarding its
application to cases involving euthanasia. As demonstrated by
the Moor verdict, the heavy emphasis that the rule places upon
the subjective intention of the treating physician can lead to
problems in cases involving a less than honest doctor or a
physician who is unclear as to what exactly his or her primary
intentions are. Likewise problematic is the application of the rule
in cases of passive euthanasia which are found to be permissible
under English law despite the clear motive of causing death
through

the removal

of treatment.

The rule

has

also been

135. Id. at 146; Linda Chavez, When Assisted Suicide Becomes
CompassionateMurder, DENVER POST, April 3, 1998, at B-11.
136.
Speden Graeme, Choice Key to Laws's Death Bill, DOMINION
(WELLINGTON), August 16, 1995, at 10, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. News File;

Macklin, supra note 37, at 15; Joanne Welford, She Must Have Suffered Untold
Agony, JOURNAL (Newcastle, UK), April 24, 1998, at 8, LEXIS, News Library, NonU.S. News File.
137.
For example, notification of cases of euthanasia were at eighteen
percent in 1990, but rose to forty-one percent in 1995 after the Dutch Parliament
approved guidelines for physicians to report assisted deaths to the coroner.
Although this number is not very high, the survey was taken shortly after the
guidelines were implemented. HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 147. Thus,
many doctors still did not report cases due to fear of prosecution, unwanted
publicity, and breaching the privacy of the patient-doctor relationship. Id. At the
time of the survey (1995), Dutch doctors who report a voluntary euthanasia death
expose the relatives of the deceased to a police investigation and themselves must
face a "long period of suspense during which they do not know whether or not
they will be prosecuted." Davies, supra note 46, at 92. The Dutch government
has attempted to remedy this problem by ordering doctors to report all euthanasia
cases to one of five regional committees which consist of legal, medical, and ethics
experts which will ensure that the proper criteria are observed. HUMPHRY &
CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 148.
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criticized for its firm basis in religious tradition and the harsh
and inequitable punishments that occur when a physician who
responds to a patient's request for death is given the same
In order to clarify the
sentence as a cold-blooded murderer.
current confusion, it will be necessary for any proposed change in
the rules to take into account these important criticisms.
A. Problems Involving the Use of Subjective Intentions
In order to distinguish between proper medical practice and
unlawful euthanasia, courts first look to the subjective intention
of the treating physician. This heavy emphasis on intention has
many implications for the moral character and clinical knowledge
of those who must apply this principle to euthanasia because it
demands scrupulous honesty in assessing one's own intentions
as well as appropriate knowledge of the patient's clinical
prognosis.1 3 8 Without full honesty and integrity on the part of
the physician regarding the intentions of treatment, the rule of
3 9
double effect fails in its purpose.'
From an idealized ethical perspective, intentions are clear
and distinct. 140 In real life situations, however, clinical intentions
14 1
The rule of
are often complex, ambiguous, and contradictory.
double effect has often been criticized for not acknowledging this
complexity, and instead using the presence or absence of a clear
purpose to judge intentions while ignoring the many foreseen
42
This is so
consequences that occur with every human action.1
because the distinction between what one intends and what one
The
significant.14 3
is
side-effects
foreseen
accepts as
simplification of intent by the double effect rule has been
described as "problematic, difficult to validate externally, and
14 4
Thus, in
inconsistent with other analysis of human intention."
order not to violate the rule of double effect in their own mind,
many physicians have learned to express their intentions while
performing ambiguous acts such as providing terminal sedation
145
Other
in terms of foreseen but unintended consequences.

138. Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 243.
139. Id.
140. Timothy E. Quill, The Ambiguity of ClinicalIntentions, 329 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1039, 1039 (1993).
141. Id. Quill points out that doctors are trained about intentions from the
perspective of clinical medicine and psychodynamic psychiatry, in which
intentions are viewed as multi-layered and complex. Id.
142. Quill, et. al., supra note 93, at 1770.
143. John Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA
EXAMINED 28 (John Keown ed., 1995)
144.
Id.

145.

Id.
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physicians, however, may reasonably interpret these same
46
actions and intentions as clear violations of the rule. 1
This distinction between intent and foresight has also been
used to show how the fundamental concept of intent is being
defined inconsistently by the courts. 14 7
In the law, there is
considerable overlap between these two notions. 1 4 8 The rule of
double effect is founded upon the traditional definition of intent
in which action X is done to bring about consequence Y.1 4 9 Legal
authority, however, also recognizes that a jury may infer intent if
death or serious injury is a virtually certain or foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's actions and the defendant
realized this at the time the action was taken.' 5 0
Despite this
legal principle, courts hold that intent may not be inferred this
way when applying the idea of double effect and that prosecutions
may not be founded upon foreseeable consequences. 15 1 Thus,
practitioners such as Moor are being tried according to a different
set of rules from anyone else who is prosecuted for murder.
Another criticism of the double effect rule is that it fails to
5 2
or partial intentions.
account multilayered
take into
Oftentimes, clinicians will not act with one exclusive intent in
medicating a terminally ill patient, but will rather hold a variety of
intentions which may or may not include offering the patient the
possibility of death when suffering becomes overwhelming and no
other acceptable means of escape are available.' 5 3 Because the
rule of double effect views clinical intentions as being simplistic
and one-dimensional, it fails to acknowledge the inescapable
multiplicity of intentions which are present in most double effect

146. Id.
147.
See Letter to the Editor from Christopher R. Morris, University of
Durham Department of Law, published in 319 Brit. Med. J. 639, 639 (Sept. 4,
1999), 1999 WL 10992455.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. In addition, most moral, social, and legal realms hold people
responsible for all reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions, not just
the intended consequences. Id. Physicians, argues Quill, should not be exempt
from this expectation. Id. The inclusion of foreseeable consequences would
encourage physicians to exercise due care in their actions by holding them
responsible for all actions that are under their control. Id.
151. Id.
152. Quill, supranote 140, at 1039-40.
153. Id. at 1040. Quill states that "multilayered intentions are present in
most, if not all, end-of-life decisions." Id. As an example, he lists many of the
intentions that he has when prescribing barbiturates to a patient: (1) To relieve
pain and suffering; (2) To ease the process of dying as much as possible; (3) To
cause death; (4) To offer the possibility of death if suffering were to become
overwhelming and there was no other acceptable escape; (5) To allow the patient
to kill themselves; (6) To enhance the patient's range of choice and degree of
control as much as possible, given the reality with which the patient is faced; and
(7) To cause the patient to die alone. Id.
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situations where one intention may not rise above the rest to
become the true purpose of a practitioner's actions.1s 4 Therefore,
unless the ethical and legal status of actions such as treating
terminally ill patients with barbiturates is clarified to reflect the
inherent complexities and contradictions present in these types of
situations, many physicians may retreat from aggressive palliative
55
treatment for fear of being prosecuted.1
B. Living Wills and the Movement Toward Legalizing Euthanasia
As previously discussed, it is not a crime under English law
for a doctor to honor a patient's request for passive euthanasia if
the request is either made to the doctor personally or by advance
directive
in
cases in which the patient is
unable to
communicate.l s 6
This rule regarding the legality of "passive
euthanasia" was established by the 1993 Bland case that
authorized the withdrawal of food and water to patients in a
persistent vegetative state.1S7 Although the "clinical, ethical, and
legal consensus that patients have the right to refuse lifesustaining treatment is well-established, such decisions are often
problematic when analyzed according to the rule of double
effect."'s8
For example, one patient who is terminally ill may decide to
discontinue mechanical ventilation knowing that there is a risk of
death but hoping that they will be able to live without the support
of medical technology.
In this case, the rule of double effect
would permit the physician to remove the ventilator because the
primary intention is to sustain the patient's life without the use of
medical means 5 9
Other patients, however, may make the
decision to remove the mechanical ventilator with the explicit
intention of escaping suffering by a quick death. In these cases,
the rule of double effect would not allow the physician to remove
the ventilator because of the intention to cause death.' 60 This is
contrary to what the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) held in the
Bland case. 16 1 Therefore, from a moral and ethical perspective,
there is no difference in intention between a doctor who fails to
provide life-saving medical treatment of a patient, in full
knowledge that this will result in the patient's death, and a doctor

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Tate, supra note 5, at 80; Woodcock, supranote 8, at 5.
Woodcock, supranote 8, at 5.
Quill et. al., supra note 93, at 1769.
Id.
Id.
Woodcock, supranote 8, at 5.
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who actively kills a patient through the use of lethal agents.1 6 2 In
both cases, the motive is the death of the patient rather than the
163
treatment of pain.
This inconsistency in the law has been interpreted by many
as a movement towards the legalization of euthanasia since it
allows a physician to intentionally hasten the death of a patient,
even if only under certain circumstances. I6 4 As Lord BrowneWilkinson said in the House of Lords, "How can it be lawful to
allow a patient to die slowly, although painlessly over a period of
weeks, from lack of food, but unlawful to produce his immediate
death by lethal injection?"' 6 5
Given the movement towards
autonomy for patients in modern day medicine, many feel that
the legalization of voluntary active euthanasia is the final area
where patients are not yet given any control over their
treatment.' 6 6 Autonomy is central to Western medical ethics and
law, and many who give considerable weight to patients' rights to
determine their own care believe that a patient's informed consent
to an action that may cause death is more important than
whether or not the physician intends to hasten death.' 67 Thus,
those who support a change in the law regarding euthanasia
argue that the patient's right to self-determination and bodily

integrity, informed consent, the absence of less harmful
alternatives, and the severity of the patient's suffering should be

162.
Christiaan Barnard, The Need for Euthanasia,in VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
178 (A.B. Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986). Barnard compares the active
versus passive euthanasia distinction to that of a railroad signalman who wants to
cause a train crash by stating that there is no ethical distinction between his
actively turning the light to green and, alternatively, his passively not turning it to
red. Id. See also Medical Use of Controlled Substances, 1999: Hearings on H.R.
2260 (testimony of Thomas J. Marzen), 1999 WL 20009420.
163.
Barnard, supra note 162, at 178.
164.
Jennifer Trueland, Activists Say New Guides Give Doctors Right to Kill,
SCOTSMAN, June 24, 1999, at 22, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. News File.
Michael Willis, the chairman of the Pro-Life Alliance, said, "I think the BMA's
statement is a disturbing development which indicates a softening on the present
position which could lead to involuntary euthanasia. It would mean that the
medical profession had a free hand to kill at will without protection of law." Id.
165.
Luisa Dillner, Doctor at Large: The Dignity of Death, GUARDIAN (LONDON),
July 22, 1997, at T16, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. News File.
166.
Trial May Prompt a 'Serious Look" at EuthanasiaDebate, PULSE, May
22, 1999, at 8, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. News File.
167.
Quill et. al., supra note 93, at 1770. Advocates of euthanasia who
argue from an autonomy standpoint state that patients ought to have the right to
take their own lives or have them be peacefully ended by a physician. Looking to
the legality of suicide by one's own hand, advocates argue that if the patient's
right to freely choose to die in suicide is accepted, there can be no moral drawback
in the exercise of this right if the choice is executed by another. GERALD DWORKIN
ET. AL., EUTHANASIA AND PHYSIcIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE 110 (1998).
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the focus of evaluating a physician's behavior, not their expressed
168
intent.
C. The Rule of Double Effect is Too Based in Religious Tradition
The rule of double effect has also been criticized for its
origins in the context of a particular religious tradition:
Christianity. 1 6 9
Because modem-day societies incorporate
multiple religious, ethical, and professional traditions, it is
necessary for medicine to accommodate various approaches to
assessing the morality of end-of-life decisions. 170
Not every
religion accepts the position that death should never be
intentionally hastened, yet the double effect rule's absolute
prohibition against deliberately taking human life is based on the
17 1
assumption that all intentional direct killing is wrong.
Because multiple religious and spiritual beliefs directly affect the
interactions that occur between physicians and their patients, the
law must recognize the various situations that may arise instead
of imposing a "religiously correct" view of death and dying upon
the medical community that is firmly rooted in one religion. 172

168. Quill et. al., supranote 93, at 1770.
169. Id.; In Christianity, suicide is as much murder as the killing of another,
and is considered worse since it also goes against the God-given duty of selfpreservation. Id. For additional history on Christianity and the prohibition of
suicide, see GERALD DWORKIN ET. AL., supra note 167, at 97-99. Religiously
motivated arguments from the Christian tradition usually take the form of a
variation on one of seven themes: (1) the argument from the command of God
(stating that God has forbidden us categorically to take human life); (2) the
argument from the general moral code given by God (stating that God's general
moral code "contains as a fundamental tenet the law that it is immoral to kill,
deliberately and of set purpose, any person except an unjust aggressor"); (3) the
argument from the chance for merit (stating that instead of hastening someone's
death, we ought to accept this time of suffering as an opportunity for the person to
develop the very virtues that God finds pleasing); (4) the teleological argument
(God, as the supreme creator of the universe, is also the planner for those
procedures and situations which occur and thus should not be interfered with);
(5) the argument from the gift of God ("Man's life is not his own to dispose of, nor
is it the prerogative of anyone to shorten it or to take it away.'); (6) the argument
from the appropriateness of death (God decides who should die and when, and we
must not interfere); and (7) the argument from eschatological considerations
(stating that those who engage in euthanasia and go against God's word will be
punished in eternal life). KLUGE, supranote 7, at 133-40.
170. Quill et. al., supranote 93, at 1770.
171. Id.
172. Id.; Timothy P. Daaleman & Bruce Frey, Spiritual and Religious Beliefs
and Practicesof FamilyPhysicians,J. FAM. PRAC., Feb. 1, 1999, at 98. This article
describes a study that attempted to identify the personal, religious, and spiritual
beliefs and practices of family physicians and test the validity and reliability
measure of religiosity that would be useful in physician populations. Id. See also
David H. Clark, Doctor's Dilemma Today, in VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 196 (A.B.

Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986).
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D. The All-or-Nothing Approach of the Double Effect
Rule Results in HarshPunishments
Because there are currently no specific laws in Britain
relating directly to voluntary euthanasia, the actions of
physicians are punished according to ordinary homicide laws
173
dealing with murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter.
Given the conditions under which many instances of voluntary
euthanasia arise, many critics suggest that treating voluntary
euthanasia as murder under British criminal law is absurd. 1 74
Murder consists of taking the life of another person with
deliberate intention or with "malice aforethought." 175
In the
typical instance of voluntary euthanasia, however, there is no
malice in the heart of the physician who is hastening death, the
life being ended is one which the patient wishes to end, and the
community is not deprived of any valuable service. 1 76 Thus, none
of the qualities that characterize the crime of murder are present
in voluntary euthanasia, and therefore it should not be treated
the same. 17 7 Viewed in light of the various problems the current
law has in assessing a physician's true intent, punishing a doctor
who allegedly ended a patient's life for murder (which carries a life
sentence) seems especially alarming.
The Criminal Law Revision committee recognized this
inconsistency in the law and in 1976 attempted to create a new
offense of "mercy-killing" which carries a penalty of only two years
imprisonment as opposed to the mandatory life sentence for
murder. 178 Mercy-killing was defined as "unlawfully killing an
incurable patient out of compassion, not necessarily at the
patient's request." 179 The idea behind the creation of this new
offense was to avoid a conviction for murder or manslaughter in
cases where a doctor acted out of compassion or in response to a
request by a patient, as opposed to the deliberate intention or
malice aforethought found in murder cases.' 8 0 The adoption of
this offense, however, was rejected by the Committee in 1980
when it discovered that it was impossible to distinguish at law

173.
The Legal Position (England and Wales), supra note 1, at 266.
Manslaughter is only applicable when there are extenuating circumstances or the
act was carried out as part of a suicide pact. Id. Extenuating circumstances
might include diminished responsibility with medical evidence to back it up. Id. at
267.
174.
Matthews, supra note 102, at 69.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 69-70.
178.
The Legal Position(Englandand Wales), supra note 1, at 267.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
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between mercy-killing and other kinds of homicide. 1 8 l Despite
this rejection, those who advocate changing the law still point to
the unfairness of punishing mercy-killings as murder and argue
that the present law regarding euthanasia in England must be
changed.

V. HAS THE TIME COME FOR PARLIAMENT TO ADDRESS THE
INADEQUACIES OF THE DOUBLE EFFECT RULE AND THE
LEGALITY OF ACTIVE EUTHANASIA?
If the past ten years have demonstrated anything to the
British government with regard to the application of the double
effect rule to euthanasia, it is that something must soon be done
to clarify the confusion that the rule has caused in both the
British medical and legal community. Although Parliament and
the British Medical Association strongly oppose any change in the
law, neither group can deny that the current law has created an
atmosphere of confusion in which many doctors already perform
euthanasia but escape prosecution by falsely stating that their
primary intentions were to simply relieve the patient's pain and
not to end their life.' 8 2 Despite countless scholarly articles and
proposed legislative bills attacking this inconsistency, there has
been a conspicuous failure to legislate on the part of Parliament
when dealing with the issue of euthanasia.' 8 3
In light of the
strong reaction to last year's Moor verdict and changing attitudes
in both the medical and general community towards the legality
of active euthanasia, however, it is unclear how much longer
Parliament can continue to duck the issue.
The need for a
legislative change in the law is even stronger when one considers
the many problems created in the Netherlands by unclear court
precedents which arose after the Dutch Parliament failed to
address the true legality of physician-assisted suicide.1 8 4 If ever
there existed an appropriate time for Parliament to change the
law governing the legality of active euthanasia, that time is now.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Horsnell, supranote 106, at 3.
HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 164.
Id. at 148-49.

2000]

DEBATING THE FUTURE OF THE DOUBLE EFFECTRULE

1063

A. Inconsistencies and Confusion: Why the Existing
Rule Must Be Changed
As previously discussed, the application of the double effect
principle to the treatment of terminally ill patients has been
highly criticized for its deficiencies. The most widely criticized of
these deficiencies is how the principle utilizes a vision of intent
which many feel is inconsistent with the real-life clinical
18 5
intentions found in situations involving end-of-life decisions.
As Dr. Timothy Quill point out, clinicians do not usually act with
one exclusive intent in medicating a terminally ill patient, but
rather with a variety of intentions that may or may not include
offering the patient the possibility of death.' 8 6 Thus, when the
multiple and complex intentions doctors experience while treating
a terminally ill patient are viewed against a law that
unrealistically defines those intentions as being independent and
straightforward, the potential for confusion is overwhelming.
1. Physician Confusion
Clarifying physician confusion created by the double effect
rule is the first reason why the English law regarding euthanasia
must be changed. The present lack of sufficient guidelines and
fear of prosecution has created an atmosphere where doctors are
unsure of how to act when faced with a patient who requires
palliative care. Unlike most laws, which at least provide abiders
with a clear idea of what is permissible, the double effect rule is
so ambiguous that doctors can interpret it a number of ways
depending on their ethical, moral, and religious views. One way
that many physicians have learned to deal with this ambiguity is
by learning to express prosecutable intentions such as death as
foreseen but unintended consequences.' 8 7 Like in the Moor case,
this "intention-shifting" allows a doctor to avoid prosecution by
classifying any punishable intent as a mere foreseeable
consequence rather than an intention of the treatment. It is
these doctors who are the most controversial figures in the
euthanasia debate, regardless of whether they are heralded as
martyrs by one side and criminals by the other.
Even more controversial, however, from the patient's
perspective, are those doctors who do not give adequate amounts
of pain relief to terminally ill patients out of fear of being

185.
186.
187.

Quill, supranote 140, at 1039-40.
Id. at 1040.
Id.
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prosecuted for murder if the patient dies while under
treatment. 18 8 Although operating under the same principle of
double effect as those doctors willing to carry out "unintentional
euthanasia," these doctors remain unwilling to prescribe
sufficient doses of diamorphine because they cannot morally or
psychologically distinguish between actions performed with the
intention of causing death and those performed with the foreseen
possibility of causing death.18 9 From a patient's standpoint, this
can be just as dangerous as an overzealous doctor. Withholding
medicine undermines the central premise of the doctor-patient
relationship: that the doctor will do everything reasonably in his
power to provide the best healthcare possible under the
circumstances.19 0
Thus, it is evident that confusion over the
double effect rule not only leads physicians to overstep their
medicinal responsibilities, but may also lead to a failure to meet
them.
2.

General Medical Council Confusion

Confusion over what actions are permissible under the
double effect rule is not just confined to physicians. The General
Medical Council of Great Britain (GMC)' 9
has been heavily
criticized for its inconsistent application of the double effect
principle in the two cases that have come before it involving
euthanasia. 19 2 In 1992, the GMC heard the case of Dr. Nigel Cox,
a consultant rheumatologist who was convicted of attempted
murder after giving a lethal injection of potassium chloride to an
elderly patient who had requested death. 193 The GMC found Cox
guilty of serious professional misconduct, stating that he had
administered "a lethal substance with no therapeutic value whose
only purpose [was] to shorten the patient's life." 1 9 4 Despite the

188. Anne Mullens, Death Debate Splits Doctors, TORONTO STAR, October 19,
1994, at A25.
189. Quill et. al., supranote 93, at 1769.
190. HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supranote 48, at 35.
191. Prosecution by the GMC is separate from prosecution by the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS). See GMC Guides Consultants but Pillories GPs, supra
note 122, at 7. The GMC acts as a sanctioning board for British doctors who are
found guilty of malpractice, while the CPS will bring separate criminal actions
against doctors who they feel clearly violated the law, such as Dr. David Moor. Id.
In some instances, such as the case of Dr. Michael Irwin, the GMC will not act
absent a conviction by the CPS. See Ellis, supra note 79, at 4. In Taylor's case,
he did not face criminal charges due to a decision by the CPS that the profession
was evenly divided over Taylor's actions and that they would not be able to get a
conviction. See GMC Guides Consultantsbut Pillories GPs, supranote 122, at 7.
192.
GMC Guides Consultants but Pillories GPs, supranote 122, at 7.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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strong disapproval of his actions evidenced in this statement,
however, Cox was9 5 neither suspended nor removed from the
practice medicine.1
Doctor Ken Taylor was not so lucky. Taylor was also found
guilty of serious professional misconduct by the GMC in April
1999 after he withdrew treatment from a patient who was
starving as a result of a series of strokes. 19 6 Unlike Dr. Cox,
however, Taylor received a six month suspension from the
The inconsistent
practice of medicine for his actions. 19 7
treatment of Cox and Taylor alarmed an already confused medical
community. Critics have suggested that this inconsistency was
the result of the composition of the two GMC committees that
The committee who heard Dr.
heard each doctor's case. 198
Taylor's case was composed of a high number of specialist
physicians. This fact was significant because one of the charges
the committee found Taylor guilty of was failure to get a second
opinion, a requirement in cases of permissible passive
euthanasia.' 9 9 Although Taylor had discussed his case with
other GPs in an attempt to comply with the law, the committee
found him guilty for failing to get a specialist opinion. 2 00 While
the law had never previously stated that a consultant geriatrician
is more competent than another experienced GP to decide the
morality of withdrawing treatment, the GMC's decision in the
the line between
Taylor case appears to make this 2 0distinction
1
compliance and violation of the law.
This inconsistency is a threatening situation for all general
practitioners. Although a finding of guilt by the GMC does not
result in incarceration, doctors still need the confidence that they
are being backed by the GMC in their actions and that their
license to practice medicine will not be revoked in situations
20 2
where they make a good faith effort to comply with the law.
Absent clear guidelines from Parliament on what constitutes
acceptable practice, however, the GMC will remain free to

Id.
195.
196. Taylor was suspended for withdrawing the medical substance Fresubin
from a patient. Id. Taylor was acting with the support of the family, and claimed
to remove the substance because the intake was never sufficient and often made
the patient "cough and splutter." Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199. The committee that heard Dr. Taylor's case consisted of a retired
consultant hematologist, a retired professor of surgery, a professor of
ophthalmology, a consultant geriatrician, two lay people, and "for the sake of
fairness," one general practitioner. Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
Trial May Prompt a 'Serious Look" at EuthanasiaDebate, supra note
202.
166, at 8.
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interpret the law in any way it sees fit, much to the detriment of
physicians such as Ken Taylor who do not attempt to violate or
push the boundaries of the law.
3. Confusion in the Courts
Establishing when a physician acted with sufficient intent for
prosecution under the double effect rule has also proved to be
quite confusing for the courts. In the Moor case, charges were
originally brought against Moor after he stated that his primary
20 3
intent in treating many patients was to hasten their death.
When he was later charged with the murder of George Liddell,
however, Moor provided the prosecution with a different account
of his intentions in an effort to claim protection under the double
Detecting that Moor was being less than
effect rule. 2 04
scrupulous about his true intentions, the court went forward with
the prosecution. In order to prove that Moor's intentions were
contrary to what he claimed, it was necessary for the prosecution
to show that the dose of diamorphine administered to Liddell was
beyond what would normally be required to ease suffering and
20 5
that Moor had the primary intention of shortening Liddell's life.
This proved to be a tremendous burden on the prosecution, with
Moor's previous declarations of his true intentions carrying very
little weight in court.2 06 In the end, the prosecution lost after the
jury to
judge excluded all medical evidence which could lead the
20 7
believe that Moor acted contrary to his stated intentions.
If the Moor case demonstrates one thing to British
prosecutors, it is the difficulty of trying to prove a doctor's true
intentions when delivering palliative care to a terminally ill
Although sufficient medical and toxicology evidence
patient.
could have presumably resulted in a conviction for murder in the
Moor case, is a jury trial really necessary for every case in which a
physician is suspected of committing active euthanasia? This
would prove to be a tremendous burden on the British legal
system's time and money. There must be some better alternative
to the current system that places entirely too much weight upon
the expressed subjective intentions of the defendant physician,
even if they are changed after the threat of prosecution is realized.
If confusion persists over what is permissible behavior under
the double effect rule, the British courts are likely to hear more

203. Trueland, supra note 84, at 12.
204. Macklin, supra note 37, at 15.
205. Johnston, supranote 69, at 5.
206. The Judge dismissed Moor's remarks as simply "silly remarks" to the
press. A Matter of Life and Death, supranote 90.
207. MacDermid, supra note 89, at 1.
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cases like that of Annie Lindsell, the woman whose GP refused to
treat her at all without first obtaining assurance from the court
that he would not be prosecuted if she were to die during
treatment. 20 8 Cases like that of Irwin and Moor will also become
more prevalent and doctors will use the courts as an opportunity
to push the boundaries of the double effect rule towards the
legalization of euthanasia. As the Dutch process has shown,
however, allowing doctors the opportunity to change the law
through the judicial system could actually make the problem
worse by having court precedents attempt to reinterpret a law
whose language and meaning is already confused enough by the
medical community. Thus, the only answer is for Parliament to
legalize euthanasia through the adoption of clear guidelines that
are easily interpretable by doctors, prosecutors, and most
importantly, the patients themselves.
B. The Law Legalizing Euthanasia:What Should it Look Like?
If British Parliament were to legalize euthanasia tomorrow, it
would make the United Kingdom the only country in the world
where active euthanasia could be performed without fear of
prosecution.
It would, however, not be the first country to
attempt to legalize the practice. In 1996, Australia became the
first country to legalize euthanasia by statute when its Northern
Territory passed the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act after long
debate.2 0 9 Only four terminally ill people 2 10 were able to take
advantage of the new law, however, before it was overturned by a
senate vote on March 24, 1997.211
Although opinion polls
indicated that more than two-thirds of Australians support
voluntary euthanasia, the House of Representatives of the federal
government in Australia used its powers to override the territory's

208.
High Court No Help to 'Easing Death" GP, supranote 67, at 2.
209.
Senate Votes to Overturn Pioneering Bill on Euthanasia, IRISH TIMES,
March 25, 1997, at 10. The Northern Territory is a small territory (twice the size
of Texas) in Australia that has not yet qualified to be a full state. Id. In 1998,
Australia was comprised of a federal government, five full states, and three
territories that will eventually become states, including the Northern Territory. Id.
Each territory has its own legislature and is largely self-governing. Id. It is
important to note, however, that the federal government may override the
decisions of the territories. HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 154-55.
210. All four people who died under the law were patients of Dr. Philip
Nitschke, who earned the nickname "Doctor Death" through his outspoken
campaign in support of the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. Robert Milliken &
Alice Springs, Canberra Kills Off the World's First Right-to-Die Legislation,
INDEPENDENT, March 25, 1997, at 14, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. News File.
211.
Senate Votes to Overturn Pioneering Bill on Euthanasia,supra note 209,
at 10.

1068

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:1035

law. 2 12
Many believed the repeal of the law was more of a
political dispute over states' rights than a consideration of the
moral, legal and medical issues surrounding the euthanasia
Regardless of the reasoning behind the senate's
debate. 2 13
action, the world's first active euthanasia law was struck down
less than a year after its enactment. With plans to legalize active
voluntary euthanasia later this year, however, the Netherlands
may soon fill the void left by the repeal of Australia's law.
In the United States, doctor-assisted suicide, backed by a
This
referendum, has been legal in Oregon since 1997.214
practice is not the same as voluntary active euthanasia because it
is the action of the patient, not the doctor, which directly brings
about the death. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act allows 'a
competent adult, who is a resident of Oregon, and has been
determined by the attending physician and the consulting
physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and who has
voluntarily expressed a wish to die, to request medication for the
purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified
Under the Oregon law, the patient must initially
manner."2 15
2 16
request suicide assistance by two oral and one written request.
After making an initial oral request to the attending physician, a
patient must wait at least fifteen days before reiterating the
request. 2 17 The patient must then wait forty-eight hours to make
the written request, which must be signed, dated, and witnessed
by at least two individuals who confirm that the patient is
competent, acting voluntarily, and has not been coerced into
Only after all these requirements are
singing the request. 2 18
fulfilled may the physician write the prescription for the lethal
2 19
drugs.
Although laws regarding the legality of euthanasia in
Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States are tailored to
address particular legal, moral, and practical concerns specific to
each country, they are still useful in drafting legislation to legalize
By studying the laws
euthanasia in the United Kingdom.
regarding euthanasia in other countries, the United Kingdom can

The House of
212. Milliken & Springs, supra note 210, at 14.
Representatives overturned the law by passing a bill sponsored by Kevin Andrews
thirty-eight votes to thirty-three. Senate Votes to Overturn Pioneering Bill on
Euthanasia,supranote 209, at 10.
213.
Milliken & Springs, supra note 210, at 14.
214. Norton, supra note 21, at 3. Euthanasia remains illegal in the other
forty-nine states. Id.
215. HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 256. For the complete text of
the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, see id. at app. C.
216.
Id. at 256.

217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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hopefully avoid many of the problems and concerns that led to
the repeal of the Australian law and the slow development of
official law in the Netherlands. In addition, the many guidelines
required by the Oregon Death with Dignity Act may also help
British Parliament to foresee what issues need to be addressed in
making physician-assisted suicide legal under the new legislation.
It is also important when discussing British legislation
concerning euthanasia to look at the many proposals that have
already been made to the British Parliament regarding the
changing of the double effect rule. For example, the VES has
presented Parliament with a number of Voluntary Euthanasia
Bills that have continually been redrafted and updated after their
systematic rejection from Parliament. 2 20
Proposals similar to
those of the VES have also come from individuals. For example,
in August 1995, Michael Laws presented his Death With Dignity
Bill to Parliament without success.2 2 1 Despite its rejection, the
bill, which was modeled after the Northern Territory's Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act and Oregon's Death With Dignity Act,
presented many new guidelines which could serve as checks that
would have to be passed before a request for death could be
met.2 2 2 Proposals such as those of the VES and Michael Laws
should be granted serious consideration by British Parliament in
rethinking its current stance against voluntary active euthanasia
since they were specifically tailored to address the euthanasia
situation in the United Kingdom.
As previously mentioned, recent events regarding euthanasia
in Britain have created an environment in which Parliament may
no longer be able to avoid the issue of the legality of euthanasia
without giving proposed changes fair consideration. The purpose
of this Note is to provide a framework for Parliament to follow
should it finally decide that the double effect principal is no
longer acceptable to the medical, legal, and general community.

220.
The Voluntary EuthanasiaSociety, supra note 45, at 255-59.
221. Graeme, supranote 136, at 10.
222.
See id. Among the procedural requirements proposed by Laws's bill
are: (1) doctors who agree to handle a request will have to tell the patient or the
patient's representative the diagnosis and prognosis, the risks associated with
euthanasia, and alternatives to death including hospice care and pain control; (2)
Doctors must refer the patient to a consultant for a second opinion on the same
matters; (3) The patient must undergo psychiatric assessment to determine
whether they are competent to make a request for euthanasia; (4) Counseling
would be compulsory, and there is to be at least a forty-eight hour waiting period
after all the other requirements are met; (5) The doctor must request that the
patient notify next-of-kin (the patient can refuse this step without making the
request void); and (6) A patient may cancel the request at any time. Laws's bill
also suggests that anyone who attempts to exert "undue pressure or influence' on
a patient or any medical staff involved with a death request could be jailed for up
to five years and be fined $250,000. Id.
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To ensure that any change in the law will benefit the British
medical community, however, it is important that new legislation
addresses the many concerns and pitfalls illustrated by proposed
British legislation and the legislation of other countries. Without
addressing these concerns at the outset, the new law will suffer
from the same uncertainties and confusion that plague the
present system and have led to its widespread criticism. In order
to ensure the effectiveness of the new law, it should contain or
address the following important procedural requirements.
1. Doctors Must Gain Fully Informed, Rational Consent
Among the most important of the proposed procedural
requirements is that the treating physician first obtain the fully
informed and voluntary consent of the patient. Not only does this
requirement put control of euthanasia decisions into the hands of
the patient, but it also draws a fine line between voluntary and
The importance of this
involuntary active euthanasia.
requirement has already been recognized by Parliament in
situations involving passive voluntary euthanasia that arose after
the 1993 Bland decision. Under English law, doctors may honor
a patient's request for passive euthanasia if either made to the
doctor personally or by an advance directive in cases where the
Therefore, this same
patient is unable to communicate. 2 23
voluntary consent requirement should also be implemented in
situations involving the legality of active euthanasia.
The voluntary consent requirement was a central focus of the
1995 Death With Dignity Bill presented to Parliament by Michael
Laws stressed that his bill concerned only the
Laws.2 2 4
legalization of voluntary euthanasia and would allow doctors to
take a patient's life only if such a request were made either during
illness or in a "living will. "2 2 5 Under Laws' proposal, a doctor who

agrees to handle a request for a patient would have to first inform
the patient or the patient's representative (in cases involving an
advance directive/living will) of the patient's diagnosis and
prognosis, the risks of the euthanasia dose and its effects, and
the alternatives to death. 22 6 These requirements ensure that a
A similar
patient's consent is fully informed when given.
requirement was also included in the Provisional Draft 1983 of

223. Woodcock, supranote 8, at 5.
224. Graeme, supra note 136, at 10. Because Laws's bill was based on the
Australian Northern Territory's Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of 1995 and the
Death with Dignity Act of Oregon, it is important to note that many of the
requirements he proposes address the concerns raised in other countries. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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the VES's Voluntary Euthanasia Bill, which states that, "It shall
be lawful for a physician to give euthanasia to a patient whose
condition has been diagnosed as irremediable if the patient has,
not less than 30 days earlier, when of sound mind, made (and not
subsequently revoked) a written and witnessed statement
declaring that in the event of his suffering from such a condition
2 27
he might wish to be given euthanasia."
The VES bill brings up an important sub-component of the
consent requirement. Before a patient's consent can be legally
enforceable, it must also be determined that the patient was of
sound mind when the consent was given. While the Voluntary
Euthanasia Bill simply defines sound mind as being of
"testamentary capacity, "22 8 Laws' Death With Dignity Bill
attempts to objectify the procedure for determining soundness of
mind by requiring all patients to undergo a psychiatric
assessment. 2 2 9 If the assessment reveals that the patient is
suffering from a mental disorder or clinical depression that would
prevent them from making a decision of this magnitude, then the
request for euthanasia is determined void.2 3 0
This same
requirement was also included into the Northern Territory's
Rights

of the

Terminally

Ill Act. 2 3 '

Thus,

a

psychiatric

assessment to determine whether a patient has the capacity to
consent to his or her death is invaluable in maintaining the
boundary between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.
In order to ensure that physicians have the proper motivation
to obtain a patient's fully informed consent, it is also necessary
that the new law include some sort of punishment for situations
in which a physician acts with less than the full, valid consent of
the patient. The Death With Dignity Bill suggests that, "Anyone
attempting undue pressure or influence on patient or any medical
staff involved with a death request could be jailed for up to five
years and fined up to $250,000."232 The ambiguous language of

the bill suggests that this punishment is applicable to anyone
who attempts to sway a patient's decision on whether or not they
want to die at the hands of their doctor. 23 3 Penalties could apply
to both anti-abortion protestors as well as those encouraging
someone to die. 23 4 In cases where the doctor is acting without

227.
VOLUNTARY
228.
229.

230.
231.

Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (Provisional Draft 1983), reprinted in
EUTHANASIA 285 app. 2 (A.B. Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986).
Id. at 287.
Graeme, supra note 136, at 10.

Id.
Geoffrey Lee Martin, Euthanasiato be Legalized by Australian State,

DAILY TELEGRAPH, April 12, 1996, at 19, LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. News File.
232. Id.
233.
Id.
234.
Id.
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any consent at all, the law should continue to prosecute the
physician under criminal law. In order to ensure that physicians
are not overly punished for their actions, perhaps the law could
be changed to recognize the offense of "mercy-killing" which was
suggested by the Criminal Law Revision in an effort to avoid
23 S
prosecuting doctors for murder under the 1961 Suicide Act.
2.

A Second Opinion as to the Patient's Condition is Required

Although the informed consent requirement is the most
important of the proposed procedural requirements, it is not
effective absent other provisions which can deter abuse by
doctors who may perform euthanasia with less than adequate
consent by the patient. One such prevention was illustrated by
the Death With Dignity Bill's requirement of a psychiatric
assessment of the patient. This measure serves as an important
check by taking the assessment of the patient's competence out of
the hands of the person who will later end the patient's life and
putting the decision into the hands of a neutral third party.
Concern with preventing abuse can also be seen in the
varying witness requirements that have long been associated with
advance declarations or "living wills"23 6 and are now included in
the VES's Voluntary Euthanasia Bill. 2 3 7
In the advance
declaration context, two witnesses who are not members of the
patient's family are required to be present when the request for
death is made.2 3 8 Thus, the witness requirement prevents abuse
by doctors who may have ulterior motives in hastening a patient's
death by ensuring that the patient is capable, is acting
voluntarily, and is not being coerced to sign the request. 23 9 The
witness requirement also prevents abuse by family members by
prohibiting those who may possibly benefit from patient's death
from becoming witnesses.
Given the widespread reports of
families in the Netherlands sending elderly relatives to premature
deaths,2 40 a neutral witness provision appears to be a valid

235. The Legal Position (England and Wales), supra note 1, at 267. Under
the offense of "mercy-killing," physicians found guilty of ending a patient's life
without consent would receive only 2 years in prison as opposed to a life sentence
for murder. Id.
236.

The Advance Declaration,in VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 288-89 app. 3 (A.B.

Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986); HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at
256.
237.
Voluntary EuthanasiaBill (ProvisionalDraft 1983), supra note 227, at
285.
238. The Advance Declaration,supranote 236, at 289.
239.
HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 256.
240.
Graeme, supranote 136, at 10.
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solution to ensuring that the patient's true wishes regarding
death are honored.
Perhaps the most effective way of preventing abuse by
doctors is to implement a second opinion requirement into the
law that would require that the patient be referred to a consultant
or independent doctor for a reevaluation of their condition. This
requirement is mentioned in every bill that has been presented to
British Parliament and was also made an integral part of both the
Northern Territory's Rights of the Terminally Ill Act and the
government-adopted guidelines found in the Netherlands. 2 4 1 A
second opinion requirement is effective for many reasons.
Besides preventing abuse by an overzealous doctor, requiring a
second opinion ensures that a patient is fully informed about the
choice they are about to make. Even if a doctor is not acting with
ulterior motives in judging a patient's capacity for decisionmaking, it is entirely possible that one doctor may simply fail to
give a patient important information that may influence their
decision. Thus, by ensuring that the patient is aware of all
treatment options and risks, the second opinion requirement
protects the voluntary aspect of a patient's decision to die.
One necessary aspect of the second opinion requirement that
will need to be addressed by new legislation is precisely who must
render the second opinion. This issue was previously addressed
in the discussion of Dr. Ken Taylor, the British GP who was
suspended for six months by the GMC for a failure to get a
second opinion in a passive euthanasia case. 2 42
Taylor's
suspension caused a great deal of confusion in the medical
community since Taylor had attempted to meet the second
opinion requirement by discussing his case with other physicians.
Taylor was suspended for failure to get a specialist opinion; a
requirement that had not been previously imposed by the law.
The second opinion requirement should clearly state on its face
what type of secondary consultation is necessary to ensure the
legality of the euthanasia.
The difficulty over who must render a second opinion also
caused a great deal of difficulty in the Northern Territory. After
the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act was put into effect in 1996,
many euthanasia supporter felt that the law was rendered useless
by regulations accompanying the act which required a second

241.
Id. (Laws's Death With Dignity Bill); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill
(ProvisionalDraft 1983), supra note 227, at 285; Martin, supra note 231, at 19
(The Australian Northern Territory's Rights of the Terminally Ill Act); Netherlands
Planningto Legalize Euthanasia,BUFFALO NEWS, August 11, 1999, at Al.
242.
GMC Guides Consultants but Pillories GPs, supranote 122, at 7.
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opinion by a specialist who is a territory resident. 2 43 Because the

Northern Territory of Australia has a population of fewer than
200,000, the territory has only a small number of medical
specialists and no cancer specialist, therefore making it close 2 to
44
impossible for the euthanasia requirements to be met.
Although the extensive population of the United Kingdom would
preclude existence of such a problem, the Australian example
remains important because it shows that specifying who renders
the second opinion matters both in determining the effectiveness
of a new law and in preventing physician confusion during

compliance with it.
As discussed in the next section, one additional procedural
requirement that should be included in the new law is that the

patient be suffering from irremediable and unbearable pain.
Thus, in order to assure that a determination of a patient's pain
is accurate, perhaps it may be necessary that one or both of the

determining physicians be a specialist in the area relevant to the
patient's condition. The Australian Act addressed this concern by

requiring that both physicians who examine the patient have at
least five years experience in the area of the patient's
condition.2 45
Therefore, if Parliament is concerned that
inaccurate determinations may lead to a disproportionate number
of patients seeking euthanasia, implementing a similar provision
requiring doctors who give a second opinion to be specialists will
help ensure that only patients whose conditions truly necessitate
euthanasia will qualify to receive such service.
3. Additional Procedural Requirements
An additional procedural requirement that was mentioned in
both proposed British legislation and foreign euthanasia laws was
a mandatory waiting or "cooling off" period. The suggested length
of this period varies from as little as forty-eight hours to thirty
days. 2 46 Regardless of what period of time is suggested by other
laws, it is important that Parliament closely examines the
competing considerations which argue for both lengthening and

243.
See Australia Split as EuthanasiaLaw Takes Effect, CHI. TRIB., July 1,
1996, at 9.
244.
Id.
245.
Martin, supranote 231, at 19.
246.
See id. (discussing Australia's nine-day waiting period); Graeme, supra
note 136, at 10 (stating that Laws proposes a forty-eight hour waiting period);
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (Provisional Draft 1983), supra note 227, at 285
(suggesting the application of a thirty day waiting period); HUMPHRY & CLEMENT,
supra note 48, at 256 (stating that the Oregon law requires a total of seventeen
days to pass between the initial oral request and the written request necessary for
passive euthanasia to be carried out).
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shortening this period of time. First, it must be ensured that the
period is long enough to provide the patient with an adequate
amount of time to reflect on this important decision. The period,
however, should not be so long as to require patients confident
with their choice to endure weeks of pain before their request may
be carried out. The argument for a shorter reflection period is
strengthened when it is considered that most patients who
request death are fairly close to dying anyway, but desire
euthanasia because the pain that they must endure is
irremediable and unbearable.
Perhaps an intermediate
requirement, such as Australia's nine day "cooling off" period 2 47
or the seventeen day period used in Oregon's Death With Dignity
Act, 2 4 8 would be an appropriate compromise between these
competing considerations.
Another important procedural requirement necessary for an
effective euthanasia law is that the patient must be suffering
irremediable and unbearable pain. This determination should be
the focus of both the initial examining physician and the
physician who renders the secondary opinion. The Voluntary
Euthanasia Bill defines irremediable as "a serious and distressing
physical illness or impairment from which the patient is suffering
without reasonable prospect of cure."2 49
A more specific
definition may be required to prevent situations like that of Annie
Lindsell, the woman whose GP went to court to seek a
determination on whether double effect would protect a doctor
whose primary intention was to alleviate the mental suffering of
his patient. 2 50 In light of the confusion that followed Lindsell's
petition to the High Court, the new law should contain a much
broader definition that will account for the wide variety of
suffering that may lead a patient to seek euthanasia. Because
the psychiatric assessment of the patient requires that the patient
not be suffering from clinical depression when consent is given to
the treating physician, it is very important that Parliament
addresses the issue of what constitutes "mental distress" under
the new legislation and that this determination be consistent in
all provisions of the law.
One of the biggest concerns that arose when Australia passed
the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act was that people would travel to
the Northern Territory specifically to die. 2 5 1 In an effort to
combat an influx of "one-way tourism," the Act implemented a

247.
248.
249.
287.
250.
251.

Martin, supranote 231, at 19.
HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 256.
Voluntary EuthanasiaBill (ProvisionalDraft 1983), supra note 227, at
Johnston, supra note 69, at 8.
Martin, supranote 231, at 19.
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residency requirement that would prevent residents of other
countries from availing themselves of the Territory's euthanasia
law, regardless of whether all other procedural requirements were
met. 25 2 This requirement proved to be effective; all four of those
who died under the provisions of the Act were Northern Territory
residents. In order to prevent an influx of terminally ill patients
to the United Kingdom, a similar residency requirement should be
imposed by the new law.
One final area that should be addressed by the new law is
the implementation of reporting requirements. For example, in
the Netherlands, guidelines adopted by the government required
physicians to report each case of euthanasia to the coroner and to
one of five regional panels, comprised of a lawyer, a doctor and an
ethics expert. 2 S 3 This panel would be responsible for reviewing
the facts of each case and recommending prosecution in those
cases in which the physician failed to meet all procedural
requirements.2 S 4 Although reporting requirements ran into many
problems in the Netherlands when they were first implemented,
subsequent studies have shown that doctors simply failed to
report cases of euthanasia because of fear of prosecution and the
effects that a possible court trial could have on their reputation
and financial situation. 25 5 Since any change in the English law
should come from Parliament and not confusing court precedent,
under-reporting due to fear of prosecution should not be a
problem for the British medical community, so long as the
procedural requirements are met. By creating a panel in which
legal, medical, and ethical interests are all represented, the
British law should ensure that only clear cases of physician
misconduct are prosecuted under the new principles.
It is also possible that additional procedural requirements
may need to be implemented into the new law. For example,
issues are sure to arise over age requirements under the law.
While Australia and Oregon both require that a patient be
eighteen years of age in order for consent to be valid, the
requirements in the Netherlands are much more relaxed, allowing
children as young as twelve to demand and receive euthanasia.2 S6
It will be important for Parliament to address smaller issues such
as the age requirement before it passes new legislation if it wishes

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
NetherlandsPlanningto Legalize Euthanasia,supranote 241, at Al.
Id.
HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 48, at 147.
See Seth Mydans, Law Allowing Doctor-Assisted Suicide Stirs Passions

in Australia, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, February 9, 1997, at 22A; Netherlands Moves

to Legalize Euthanasia, WASH. POST, August 11, 1999, at A16; Brad
Knickerbocker, Sanctioned Euthanasia: Lessons From Abroad, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, December 3, 1998, at 1.
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to avoid the many court cases seeking interpretation of the
requirements that plague the current principle of double effect.
Most importantly, it is crucial that physicians understand
the procedural requirements thoroughly so that there is no
confusion as to when one's actions constitute illegal euthanasia.
Thus, educational programs, such as those required by the
Northern Territory, 2 s7 should accompany any proposed change in
the law and clearly address potential areas of confusion such as
the timing of informed consent.
While similar educational
programs have already been attempted by the BMA in England,
the many inconsistencies in the law of double effect prevent even
the clearest of instructions from adequately addressing the
questions and concerns of British doctors. Therefore, without
also changing the law regarding euthanasia, educational
programs aimed solely at correcting physician conduct will
continue to be useless.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Note has attempted to point out the various events and
factors that underlie the current push for Parliament to change
the law regarding voluntary active euthanasia.
Since its
introduction to the British legal system in the 1956 Adams case,
the double effect principle has been criticized for its unrealistic
assumptions regarding clinical intentions and its naive reliance
upon scrupulous physician honesty in the face of prosecution.
While Parliament has been able to avoid legislating on euthanasia
for decades by hiding behind the support of the Church of
England, the Roman Catholic Church, and the British Medical
Association, recent events such as the Sunday Times attitudes
survey and the Moor verdict have created an atmosphere in which
Parliament may no longer be able to avoid future attempts to pass
legislation.
What Parliament will do next remains the ultimate issue in
the case for legalizing voluntary active euthanasia in the United
Kingdom. Supporters of changing the current law can only hope
that recent events in the British medical and legal systems will
lead Parliament and the BMA to sway their position in order to
provide doctors with clear guidelines in euthanasia situations.
While such a radical change can hardly be expected in light of
years of inaction, the legalization of voluntary passive euthanasia
after the Bland verdict provides hope that Parliament will respond
to recent events before difficult and unclear court precedents

257.

Martin, supra note 231, at 19.
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begin to change the law of voluntary active euthanasia in the
United Kingdom.
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